Shireesha Reddy Cheruku v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-22-2011 
Shireesha Reddy Cheruku v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Shireesha Reddy Cheruku v. Atty Gen USA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 421. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/421 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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1
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                 Respondent 
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA No. A078-722-997 
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Honorable Eugene Pugliese) 
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Argued May 24, 2011 
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 According to the I-485 adjustment of status application, the 
petitioner‟s full name is “Shireesha Reddy Cheruku,” not 
“Reddy Shireesha” as the IJ and BIA both stated in their 
respective decisions.   (A.R. 82, 86).  We therefore amend the 
caption and will refer to the petitioner by her last name, 
Cheruku. 
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Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, 
SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 22, 2011) 
 
EDWARD J. CUCCIA, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
Ferro & Cuccia 
100 Lafayette Street, Suite 201 
New York, New York 10013 
 Attorney for Petitioner 
 
PATRICK J. GLEN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
BENJAMIN ZEITLIN, ESQUIRE 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
 Attorneys for Respondent 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Reddy Cheruku filed a petition for review of the BIA‟s 
decision affirming denial of her application to adjust her 
status to that of a lawful permanent resident under the Legal 
Immigration Family Equity Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), because 
she was found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).  We will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 The facts are undisputed.  Cheruku, a citizen of India, 
entered the United States in 1995 on a B-1 visa, which she 
subsequently overstayed.  After her visa expired, she accrued 
more than one year of unlawful presence in the United States.  
In 1998, Cheruku and her employer filed an application for 
labor certification that was approved in March 1999.  Her 
employer then filed a Petition for Alien Worker that was 
granted on November 29, 2000.  On December 21, 2001, 
Cheruku applied to adjust her immigration status to that of a 
lawful permanent resident under the Legal Immigration 
Family Equity Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (LIFE Act). 
 While her application for adjustment of status was 
pending, Cheruku applied for and was granted an advanced 
parole.
2
  The advanced parole document issued to Cheruku 
warned that if she accrued more than 180 days of unlawful 
presence subsequent to April 1, 1997, and subsequent to 
applying for adjustment of status, and then departed the 
United States, she “may be found inadmissible under section 
212(a)(9)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)] of the Act when 
[she] return[s] to the United States to resume the processing 
of [her] application.”  Notwithstanding this warning, Cheruku 
traveled outside the United States and used the advanced 
                                                 
2
 Advanced parole permits an alien temporarily to remain in 
“the United States pending a decision regarding his 
application for admission.”  Bamba v. Rile, 366 F.3d 195, 196 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).  When used to enter the United States 
initially or after travel, “„this amounts to permission . . . for 
ingress into the country but is not a formal “admission”.‟” Id. 
(quoting Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 392 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1999)). 
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parole to be permitted to reenter the United States upon her 
return on November 28, 2002. 
 On April 28, 2004, Cheruku‟s application for 
adjustment of status under the LIFE Act was denied because 
her travel outside of the country rendered her inadmissible for 
a period of ten years under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 
commonly referred to as the ten-year bar.  She filed a petition 
to reopen, which was denied on August 5, 2004.  On August 
31, 2004, Cheruku was served with a Notice to Appear 
charging her with being removable under the ten-year bar, 8 
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), because she had accrued more 
than one year of unlawful presence in the United States, 
departed the United States, and subsequently sought 
admission within ten years of her departure.
3
 
 In removal proceedings, Cheruku renewed her 
application for adjustment of status.  The Immigration Judge 
initially held he lacked jurisdiction over the adjustment 
application because Cheruku was an arriving alien.  In 
response, Cheruku appealed to the BIA.  The BIA remanded 
proceedings to the IJ in light of intervening case law that 
permits immigration judges to adjudicate certain adjustment 
applications.  The IJ denied Cheruku‟s application on 
February 27, 2008, and granted her request for voluntary 
departure.  Cheruku timely appealed to the BIA. 
 Before the BIA, Cheruku made several arguments: 
first, that the LIFE Act waived the statutory bar to 
admissibility; second, that the circumstances of her departure 
and return were factually distinguishable from those at issue 
in prior BIA precedents; third, that the Department of 
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 Cheruku concedes she is inadmissible under this provision. 
5 
 
Homeland Security (DHS) should be equitably estopped from 
finding her inadmissible, or in the alternative, that she should 
be afforded retroactive, nunc pro tunc, equitable relief; and 
finally, that the grant of an advanced parole should require 
DHS to disregard her departure. 
 The BIA denied Cheruku‟s appeal on December 18, 
2009.  In its decision, the BIA relied on its opinion In re 
Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. 373, 379-80 (BIA 2007), in 
which it held aliens inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) 
are ineligible for adjustment of status under the LIFE Act.  
The BIA noted the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit had called Lemus-Losa into question, see 
Lemus-Losa v. Holder, 576 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2009), but 
reiterated its understanding of the statutes as set forth in 
Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. 373.  In addition, the BIA 
emphasized the advanced parole document issued to Cheruku 
explicitly warned that if she were to leave the United States, 
she could be found inadmissible upon her return.  The BIA 
accordingly rejected Cheruku‟s equitable estoppel argument, 
finding no misconduct on the part of DHS.  The BIA also 
rejected Cheruku‟s request for retroactive relief stating it was 
precluded by statute from creating a retroactive waiver of 
inadmissibility, and it rejected her argument that the advanced 
parole document should render her departure a nullity.  
Consequently, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge‟s 
conclusion that Cheruku was ineligible for adjustment of 
status, and granted her request for voluntary departure. 
 Cheruku timely petitioned for review of the BIA‟s 
decision and renews her arguments on appeal. 
II. 
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 The BIA had appellate jurisdiction over Cheruku‟s 
removal proceeding under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 
1240.15.  We have jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
 Because the BIA issued a fully reasoned opinion, we 
review the BIA‟s opinion as the final agency decision.  
Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We review questions of law, such as the BIA‟s 
interpretation of immigration statutes, de novo, “including 
both pure questions of law and applications of law to 
undisputed facts,” Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 171 (3d 
Cir. 2008), “subject to the principles of deference articulated 
in Chevron v. [NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844] (1984),” Kaplun v. 
Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 “The BIA‟s construction of the statute is entitled to 
deference and must be accepted by the Court if it is based 
upon a permissible construction of the statute.”  Filja v. 
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842-43).  Such deference is “especially 
appropriate in the immigration context where officials 
exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate 
questions of foreign relations.”  INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (internal quotation omitted).  
 We conduct a two-part inquiry, first asking “whether 
„the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue‟ before [us].”  Id., at 424 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843).  If the statute‟s language is clear and unambiguous, we 
uphold the plain meaning of the statute.  See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-33 & n.12 (1987).  But if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous, “„the question for the court [is] 
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whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.‟”  Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 
424 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).  When the ambiguity 
is implicit, “if the [BIA‟s] construction is reasonable, 
Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency‟s 
construction of the statute, even if the agency‟s reading 
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory 
interpretation.”  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).  
III. 
A. 
 On appeal, Cheruku challenges the BIA‟s 
determination that her inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) precludes her adjustment of status under 
the LIFE Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).  In support, she contends 
the LIFE Act waives the statutory ten-year bar to 
admissibility.  Conversely, the Government contends the 
conflict between the provisions of the LIFE Act and certain 
grounds for inadmissibility introduces ambiguity into the 
statutory scheme and, consequently, that we owe deference to 
the BIA‟s reasonable statutory interpretation. 
1. 
 Our first task is to determine whether the statutory 
scheme is ambiguous.  Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.  In 
1994, Congress amended the INA by adding a new section—
245(i), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)—otherwise known as 
the LIFE Act.  In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 358-61 
(BIA 2007).  The LIFE Act was enacted to permit certain 
aliens unlawfully present in the United States to apply to 
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adjust their statuses to that of lawful permanent residents 
without having to undergo consular inspection and admission 
abroad.
4
  See Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 359-61.  On its face, 
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 In relevant part, § 1255(i) reads: 
(i) Adjustment in status of certain aliens 
physically present in United States  
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of 
subsections (a) and (c) of this section, an 
alien physically present in the United 
States—  
(A) who—  
(i) entered the United States without 
inspection; or  
(ii) is within one of the classes 
enumerated in subsection (c) of this 
section;  
(B) who is the beneficiary (including a 
spouse or child of the principal alien, if 
eligible to receive a visa under section 
1153(d) of this title) of—  
(i) a petition for classification under 
section 1154 of this title that was filed 
with the Attorney General on or 
before April 30, 2001; or  
(ii) an application for a labor 
certification under section 
1182(a)(5)(A) of this title that was 
filed pursuant to the regulations of the 
Secretary of Labor on or before such 
date; and  
(C) who, in the case of a beneficiary of a 
petition for classification, or an 
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§ 1255(i)(2)(A) of the LIFE Act requires an alien to be 
“admissible” to the United States in order to qualify for 
adjustment. 
 In 1997, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208 § 301, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-577-78 (1997), 
                                                                                                             
application for labor certification, 
described in subparagraph (B) that was 
filed after January 14, 1998, is physically 
present in the United States on December 
21, 2000; 
may apply to the Attorney General for the 
adjustment of his or her status to that of an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
. . . . 
(2) Upon receipt of such an application and 
the sum hereby required, the Attorney 
General may adjust the status of the alien to 
that of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if—  
(A) the alien is eligible to receive an 
immigrant visa and is admissible to the 
United States for permanent residence; 
and 
(B) an immigrant visa is immediately 
available to the alien at the time the 
application is filed. 
. . . . 
Congress later amended the section, extending its expiration 
date, and adding additional requirements. See Padilla-
Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140, 1148 n.7 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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which, among other things, added several statutory provisions 
to the INA rendering certain groups of aliens inadmissible.  
See Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 358.  Section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 
of the INA, added by IIRIRA, generally renders inadmissible 
those who are “present in the United States without being 
admitted or paroled, or who arrive[] in the United States at 
any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney 
General.”   Congress also added other, more specific, bars to 
admissibility when it enacted IIRIRA.  The provisions of § 
1182(a)(9)(C) render inadmissible aliens having certain prior 
immigration violations, and the provisions of § 1182(a)(9)(B) 
render inadmissible for a period of time aliens who have 
accrued a period of unlawful presence.   
 The adjustment provisions of § 1255(i) are clearly in 
tension with the bars to admissibility set forth in § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Further complicating matters, the prefatory 
language of § 1182(a) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible . . . are 
ineligible to be admitted to the United States.”  Unless this 
“savings clause” is applied, a straightforward application of § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) would render the LIFE Act a nullity by 
barring from adjustment any individual not admitted or 
paroled.  See Mora v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 231, 237-38 (2d Cir. 
2008).  Because we are “unable to infer from the statutory 
language the way in which 1255(i) implicitly waives unlawful 
presence as a ground for inadmissibility,”  we join with our 
sister circuits in finding the statute ambiguous.  Herrera-
Castillo v. Holder, 573 F.3d 1004, 1008 (10th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3505 (2010); see also Garfias-
Rodriguez v. Holder, No. 09-72603, --- F.3d ----, 2011 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7406, at *15 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011); Padilla-
Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011); 
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Ramirez v. Holder, 609 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Renteria-Ledesma v. Holder, 615 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 
2010); Villanueva v. Holder, 615 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 
2010); Mora, 550 F.3d at 237-38; Ramirez-Canales v. 
Mukasey, 517 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 2008); Mortera-Cruz v. 
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 253 (5th Cir. 2005).   
2. 
 Having found the statute to be ambiguous, we evaluate 
whether the BIA‟s interpretation of the statutes is reasonable.  
See Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 980.  The BIA has 
read § 1255(i) as an implicit waiver of inadmissibility under § 
1182(a), but only for those aliens who are inadmissible under 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  See Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 365.   
According to the BIA, “[LIFE Act] adjustment remains 
available to aliens inadmissible under [1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] only 
because a contrary interpretation would render the language 
of [the LIFE Act] so internally contradictory as to effectively 
vitiate the statute, an absurd result that Congress is presumed 
not to have intended.”  Id. (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 
498 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1991)). 
 The BIA has not, however, found the more specific 
bars to admissibility, added by IIRIRA, to be waived by the 
LIFE Act.  In Briones, the BIA also held that adjustment of 
status under the LIFE Act is unavailable to recidivist 
immigration violators barred from admission under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).  See id. at 371.  Every circuit court of 
appeals to review the Briones decision has upheld it as a 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme. See 
Garfias-Rodriguez, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7406, at *15; 
Padilla-Caldera, 637 F.3d at 1152; Ramirez, 609 F.3d at 337; 
Renteria-Ledesma, 615 F.3d at 908; Villanueva, 615 F.3d at 
12 
 
915; Mora, 550 F.3d at 239; Ramirez-Canales, 517 F.3d at 
910. 
 In Lemus-Losa, the BIA considered the provision at 
issue here, which renders inadmissible any alien who “has 
been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or 
more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the 
date of such alien‟s departure or removal from the United 
States.”5  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).  The BIA held 
aliens who are inadmissible under this provision are ineligible 
for adjustment of status under the LIFE Act absent the grant 
of a waiver.  See Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 378. 
 The BIA offered several reasons in support of its 
interpretation.  Notably, the BIA distinguished the specific 
inadmissibility provisions of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) from the 
more general inadmissibility provision of § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  
Id. at 378.  It reaffirmed its conclusion that the general 
provisions of § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) would render the LIFE Act a 
nullity, but it concluded application of the inadmissibility 
provisions of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) would not lead to such an 
absurd result.  Id.  Rather, the BIA explained that unlike § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i), which simply punishes those who enter the 
country without inspection, the ten-year bar of § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) “punishes aliens who seek admission . . . 
after having previously accrued a period of unlawful status.”  
Id. at 379.  Consequently, the BIA concluded its 
interpretation was consistent with the “overall purpose of 
                                                 
5
 “Departure” has been read to include any departure, Lemus-
Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 376-77, and Cheruku does not appear 
to challenge BIA‟s construction of “departure.”  In fact, 
Cheruku does not contest her inadmissibility under this 
provision at all. 
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[1182(a)(9)] to compound the adverse consequences of 
immigration violations by making it more difficult for 
individuals who have left the United States after committing 
such violations to be lawfully admitted thereafter.”  Id. 
(quotation omitted).  
 The BIA also noted that whenever Congress has 
“extended eligibility for adjustment of status to inadmissible 
aliens, it has done so unambiguously.”  Id. at 378.  In support, 
the BIA observed Congress had expressly provided a waiver 
of inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(9)(B) for aliens seeking 
adjustment of status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and 
Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 
2193 (1997), and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-538 (1992).  Lemus-
Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 378 & n.5. 
 The two circuit courts of appeals to have reviewed the 
BIA‟s decision in Lemus-Losa have reached opposite results.  
The Tenth Circuit found the statute to be ambiguous and 
upheld the BIA‟s interpretation of the statutory scheme as 
reasonable. See Herrera-Castillo, 573 F.3d at 1009.  A few 
weeks later, the Seventh Circuit considered the same issue.  It 
observed that § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I),
6
 the provision at issue in 
                                                 
6
 This section provides: 
(i) In general Any alien who—  
(I) has been unlawfully present in the United 
States for an aggregate period of more than 1 
year, or  
(II) has been ordered removed under section 
1225(b)(1) of this title, section 1229a of this 
title, or any other provision of law, and who 
14 
 
Briones, and § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)
7
 “both are triggered by an 
initial sojourn in the United States that was unlawful,” but 
                                                                                                             
enters or attempts to reenter the United States 
without being admitted is inadmissible. 
(ii) Exception Clause (i) shall not apply to an 
alien seeking admission more than 10 years 
after the date of the alien‟s last departure from 
the United States if, prior to the alien‟s 
reembarkation at a place outside the United 
States or attempt to be readmitted from a 
foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security has consented to the alien‟s 
reapplying for admission. 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i). 
7
 This section provides: 
(i) In general Any alien (other than an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence) 
who—  
(I) was unlawfully present in the United States 
for a period of more than 180 days but less than 
1 year, voluntarily departed the United States 
(whether or not pursuant to section 1254a(e)  of 
this title) prior to the commencement of 
proceedings under section 1225(b)(1) of this 
title or section 1229a of this title, and again 
seeks admission within 3 years of the date of 
such alien‟s departure or removal, or  
(II) has been unlawfully present in the United 
States for one year or more, and who again 
seeks admission within 10 years of the date of 
such alien‟s departure or removal from the 
United States, is inadmissible. 
15 
 
that (C)(i)(I) applies to aliens “who enter[] or attempt[] to 
reenter the United States without being admitted,” while 
(B)(i)(II) applies to aliens “who again seek[] admission 
within ten years of the alien‟s departure or removal from the 
United States.”  Lemus-Losa, 576 F.3d at 757 (quotations and 
emphasis omitted).  Consequently, in its view, § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) should be treated analogously to § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because “if someone is „seeking admission‟ 
to the United States on that second occasion and has thus 
demonstrated that he is willing to play by the rules, he is no 
different from the alien who is physically present in the 
United States „without inspection‟ but who is entitled to apply 
for LIFE Act relief.”  Lemus-Losa, 576 F.3d at 761.  
Accordingly, it held the BIA erred because it “did not pay 
sufficient heed to the difference between § (B)(i)(II), . . . and 
§ (C)(i)(I),” granted the petition for review, and remanded the 
case to the BIA for further proceedings.
8
  Id. 
3. 
 Cheruku urges us to adopt the Seventh Circuit‟s 
position that, on the balance, § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) is 
distinguishable from § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), and should be read 
analogously to § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), which the BIA reads as 
being implicitly waived by the LIFE Act.
9
  Relying on 
                                                                                                             
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)(footnote omitted). 
8
 Although the Seventh Circuit noted Chevron controlled its 
analysis, Lemus-Losa, 576 F.3d at 755-56, it does not appear 
to have applied that framework.  It neither explicitly found 
the statute to be ambiguous, nor explicitly held the BIA‟s 
interpretation of the statute to be unreasonable.  
9
 Cheruku appears to contend in the alternative that Lemus-
Losa is distinguishable because, unlike the petitioner in 
16 
 
Lemus-Losa, she stresses that, by applying for and being 
granted advanced parole, she “demonstrated [she] is willing 
to play by the rules.”  The Seventh Circuit‟s view regarding 
harsher treatment for those who do not play by the rules has 
considerable appeal and were we not constrained by Chevron 
we might agree.  But principles of deference require a 
different result. 
The BIA reasonably concluded the general 
inadmissibility provision of § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) is 
distinguishable from the more specific provision of § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).  Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 378.  
Unlike the bar to admissibility in § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 
application of the ten-year bar does not render the LIFE Act a 
nullity.  Id.  The group of aliens barred by § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 
simply because they are unlawfully present is not coextensive 
with the smaller group of aliens barred under § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) because they accrue a period of unlawful 
presence, depart, and subsequently return seeking lawful 
admission within ten years of the departure.  An interpretation 
upholding the § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) bar would make unlawful 
presence “„both a qualifying and a disqualifying condition for 
adjustment of status,‟”  Herrera, 573 F.3d at 1007 (quoting 
Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 362); see also Lemus-Losa, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. at 378, but the same cannot be said for § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).  Thus, no implicit waiver is required to 
                                                                                                             
Lemus-Losa, who departed the United States and returned 
through an illegal border crossing, Cheruku traveled on a duly 
issued advanced parole before seeking admission into the 
United States.  This argument is unavailing.  Regardless of 
the circumstances of departure and return, both petitioners are 
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 
17 
 
give effect to the words of the statute.  Under the BIA‟s 
interpretation of the interplay between the ten-year bar and 
the LIFE Act, the prohibition on departure is a 
straightforward rule with which aliens seeking adjustment of 
status must comply—a rule displayed on advanced parole 
documents such as those issued to Cheruku. 
 We acknowledge that aliens inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) who attempt to enter or reenter without 
being admitted may be more culpable than those under § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) who are seeking admission, but we do not 
think this difference undermines the BIA‟s reasoning that the 
provisions are similar.  Both are specific bars to admissibility 
as distinguished from the more general provision of § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Nor do we think the difference in relative 
culpability absolves those barred by § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of 
all culpability or leads to the inevitable conclusion that 
Congress implicitly intended to waive inadmissibility for 
those aliens.  While we may question whether the policy 
choices furthered by the BIA‟s interpretation of the statutory 
scheme are wise, we remain mindful that  “the place to resist 
unwise or cruel legislation touching aliens is the Congress, 
not th[e] [c]ourt[s].”  Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 598 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 We believe the BIA‟s interpretation of the statutory 
scheme is reasonable and consistent with Congress‟s intent.  
See Herrera-Castillo, 573 F.3d at 1009.  Under the ten-year 
bar, an alien with a one-year period of unlawful presence in 
the U.S. would not be eligible for consular admission and 
inspection at all during the applicable bar period without a 
waiver of inadmissibility.  As explained by the BIA, the 
provisions of § 1182(a)(9), including the ten-year bar, were 
intended to deter aliens who had accrued unlawful presence 
18 
 
and then left the United States from later seeking admission.  
Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 379.  But the LIFE Act still 
permits adjustment for an eligible alien who has accrued a 
period of unlawful presence provided he or she does not 
depart the United States before seeking admission.  Although 
this may sometimes lead to a harsh result, Congress has 
provided some relief by granting the Attorney General 
discretion to waive inadmissibility to accommodate family 
unity in certain circumstances.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).   
We accord deference to the BIA‟s conclusion that “the 
language and structure of the relevant statutes[,] along with 
Congress‟s specific waivers in certain instances,” Herrera-
Castillo, 573 F.3d at 1009, best effectuates IIRIRA‟s goals, 
Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 379, as well as the LIFE 
Act‟s remedial purposes of lifting administrative burdens by 
facilitating processing of aliens physically present in the 
United States, and of promoting family unity, Briones, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. at 360-61; Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 378.  
Therefore we defer to the BIA‟s interpretation of the statutory 
scheme.   
B. 
 Cheruku also contends the DHS is equitably estopped 
from denying her admission, or in the alternative, the BIA 
erred in determining equitable retroactive relief was 
unavailable to mitigate the harsh result of this case.  Neither 
argument has merit. 
 Cheruku contends the DHS should be estopped from 
denying her admission because she was deceived into 
believing the advanced parole would immunize her against a 
later finding of inadmissibility.  To prevail, Cheruku must 
show that the DHS made a misrepresentation upon which she 
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reasonably relied to her detriment, and that the DHS engaged 
in affirmative misconduct.  See Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 
F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006).  Regardless of how Cheruku 
interpreted the advanced parole document, the words on the 
document clearly stated: 
If, after April 1, 1997, you were unlawfully 
present in the United States for more than 180 
days before applying for adjustment of status, 
you may be found inadmissible under section 
212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Act when you return to 
the United States to resume the processing of 
your application.  If you are found inadmissible, 
you will need to qualify for a waiver of 
inadmissibility in order for your adjustment of 
status application to be approved. 
The document explicitly warned Cheruku that by traveling on 
the advanced parole, she may render herself inadmissible.
10
  
Accordingly, she has failed to demonstrate any 
misrepresentation or affirmative misconduct by DHS.  
Cheruku was mistaken concerning the consequences of 
departing the United States under her advanced parole.  While 
regrettable, this cannot form the basis of an equitable estoppel 
claim. 
                                                 
10
 Cheruku also appears to argue that the BIA should treat 
travel on an advanced parole as if the travel never occurred.  
The advanced parole clearly anticipates travel, as well as 
possible effects on an alien‟s admissibility as a result of 
travel.  Cheruku cites no authority in support of her assertion, 
and there is no basis for us to conclude that travel on an 
advanced parole should be excused. 
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 Nor can we say the denial of retroactive equitable 
relief was in error.  Retroactive relief, often referred to as 
nunc pro tunc relief, has “long [been] employed by the 
immigration authorities, based on what they believe to be 
implied statutory authority to provide relief from the harsh 
provisions of the immigration laws in sympathetic cases.”  
See Gonzalez-Balderas v. Holder, 597 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 
2010) (citing Patel v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 685, 693 (6th Cir. 
2005); Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2004)).  
But the BIA has generally limited the grant of orders nunc 
pro tunc to a few limited circumstances.  It appears to have 
granted such retroactive relief only to permit the exercise of 
discretion to allow an alien to reapply for admission, to apply 
the law as it existed when the alien violated the immigration 
laws, Ramirez-Canales, 517 F.3d at 910, or to correct an error 
in immigration proceedings, Edwards, 393 F.3d at 309. 
 Here, the BIA concluded nunc pro tunc relief was 
unavailable based on its decision in In re Torres-Garcia, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 866, 876 (BIA 2006).  In Torres-Garcia, the BIA 
held that because the statutory provisions of § 1182(a)(9) of 
the INA clearly delineate the limited conditions under which 
the DHS has the discretion to grant waivers of 
inadmissibility, grant of a de facto waiver not specified by 
statute would be inconsistent with congressional intent.  Id. at 
874-76.  Specifically, Torres-Garcia rejected the contention 
that the waiver provision of 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 granted 
discretion to waive inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i).
11
  
Id. at 876.  This interpretation has been affirmed by circuits 
that have considered the issue.  See Gonzalez-Balderas, 597 
                                                 
11
 As noted, §§ 1182(a)(9)(B) & (C) were both added to the 
INA when Congress enacted IIRIRA. 
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F.3d at 869-71; Delgado v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 
2008); Gonzales v. DHS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 Cheruku does not contend the regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 
212.2 authorize the grant of a waiver.  Nor does she contend 
her case falls within any of the traditional categories for 
which the BIA has granted nunc pro tunc relief.  Rather, she 
simply contends without support that the BIA could have 
exercised equitable relief.   But “[a] court may not award 
equitable relief in contravention of the expressed intent of 
Congress.”  Edwards, 393 F.3d at 309 (citing INS v. 
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883-85 (1988)).  As noted, 
Cheruku was found inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).  
Section 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)(iii) delineates exceptions to 
inadmissibility, and § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) expressly sets forth 
the conditions under which the DHS may waive 
inadmissibility, which pertain exclusively to family unity.  
Cheruku is not eligible for any statutory waiver to 
inadmissibility since her adjustment application relies on her 
work status rather than on any family connection.  
Accordingly, because Congress clearly delineated the 
situations in which the Attorney General may exercise 
discretion to grant a waiver to inadmissibility under this 
section, the BIA did not err in holding equitable nunc pro 
tunc relief is foreclosed by the plain language of the statute.
12
  
See Gonzalez-Balderas, 597 F.3d at 870 (“The statute is clear 
and the Board‟s ruling correct . . . .”); Ramirez, 609 F.3d at 
337 n.7 (rejecting without discussion petitioner‟s arguments 
                                                 
12
 We note that even if there were ambiguity on this point, we 
would find the BIA‟s interpretation to be reasonable.   
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that remand should be granted to remedy the BIA‟s denial of 
nunc pro tunc relief). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the BIA and deny the petition for review. 
1 
 
McKee, Chief Judge, concurring. 
 
Although I agree that Cheruku is inadmissible for 
adjustment of status under a strict interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) as explained by my colleagues,  I write 
separately because the result we must reach is as unjust as it 
is unreasonable.
1
    
 
Cheruku is an educated software engineer who is 
employed and her employer is trying to help her remain in the 
United States.  (A.R. 66, 333).  She is a highly skilled 
professional who, according to her employer, is engaged in 
“research, design, and develop[ment] [of] software and 
programs for high tech medical, industrial, scientific, 
financial business applications, lead[ing] teams of 
programmers and systems analysts in projects,” and 
“develop[ing] and direct[ing] systems testing procedures, 
programming and documentation.”  (A.R. 258).  She has no 
criminal record, nor can she be characterized as the type of 
“recidivist immigration violator” that Congress appropriately 
seeks to exclude from this country.  8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(i).   
 
Moreover, nothing on this record suggests that 
Cheruku has done anything other than pay all applicable taxes 
while employed here, and she clearly has a demonstrated skill 
in a highly specialized field that this country needs to be 
competitive in several important industries.  (A.R. 263-69).  
In addition, Cheruku’s continued presence in this country 
does not portend any drain on social resources.  In short, as 
her employer’s affidavit suggests, she appears to be exactly 
the kind of person the United States should welcome.  (A.R. 
258). 
 
Cheruku did not enter the United States illegally.  
Rather, she arrived on a visitor’s visa, and then re-entered the 
country in 2002 pursuant to a grant of advanced parole.  
                                              
1
 According to the I-485 adjustment of status application, the 
petitioner’s full name is “Shireesha Reddy Cheruku,” not 
“Reddy Shireesha” as the IJ and BIA both stated in their 
respective decisions.   (A.R. 82, 86).  We will therefore refer 
to the petitioner by her last name, Cheruku.   
2 
 
Although she overstayed her original visa, she later made a 
concerted effort to “play by the rules” by applying for 
advanced parole with the assistance of counsel.   
 
Ironically, it seems quite likely that Cheruku only left 
the country in the first place because the United States gave 
her permission to return.  The Government now seeks to 
remove her because she left the country after she applied for, 
and received, a document from the Government explicitly 
allowing her to leave.  As the Immigration Judge quite 
correctly observed, the advanced parole document she was 
given was “at best a schizophrenic document,” because on 
one hand “[i]t says we’re going to allow you to do something, 
but then we might change our mind and not allow you to do it 
or something like that.  You can always leave, but you might 
not be able to get back.”  (A.R. 76).  
 
Yet, as my colleagues explain, the statute says what it 
says and it is not our job to rewrite what Congress has 
decreed unless a literal application of the statute would “lead 
to a patently absurd result that no rational legislature could 
have intended.”  Barrios v. Att'y Gen. 399 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 
2005).    Although I do not think that is the general case here 
and therefore do not dissent from the majority opinion, I 
nevertheless think that as applied to Cheruku, the result we 
reach today suggests the wisdom of Charles Dickens’ 
condemnation of the law that was uttered by Mr. Bumble in 
Oliver Twist.
2
 
 
The majority correctly points out that Cheruku was 
technically placed on notice that her immigration status could 
be in jeopardy if she left the country because of the warning 
on her advanced parole document.   That warning states:  
 
NOTICE TO APPLICANT:  
Presentation of this authorization will 
permit you to resume your application 
for adjustment of status upon your 
                                              
2
 Mr. Bumble is the despicable character in Oliver Twist who 
said: “if the law supposes that, then the law is [absurd].” 
Bumble’s actual quote is far more expressive and irreverent.  
 
3 
 
return to the United States.  If your 
adjustment application is denied, you 
will be subject to removal proceedings 
under section 235(b)(1) or 240 of the 
Act.  If after April 1, 1997, you were 
unlawfully present in the United 
States for more than 180 days before 
applying for adjustment of status, you 
may be found inadmissible under 
section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Act 
when you return to the United States 
to resume the processing of your 
application.  If you are found 
inadmissible, you will need to quality 
for a waiver of inadmissibility in order 
for your adjustment of status 
application to be approved.     
 
 I am not at all sure that someone who is born in the 
United States and is fluent in English could comprehend this 
warning.  I am far less certain that someone in Cheruku’s 
situation could.  The language is confusing and ambiguous as 
the Immigration Judge explained.  The phrase: “presentation 
of this authorization will permit you to resume your 
application,” (emphasis added), leads one to believe that 
Cheruku should indisputably have been able to pick up where 
she left off with her adjustment of status application once she 
returned to the United States.  However, the warning then 
states, “you may be found inadmissible” (emphasis added).  
The latter implies that Cheruku may not be admissible under 
some unknown statute, but just as equally implies that she 
may very well be found admissible.  The fact that “will” 
precedes “may” could easily mislead a person to believe that 
his/her adjustment of status would not be adversely affected 
by a departure.  The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that there is no explanation of what section 235(b)(1) or 
240 of the Act or section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)  mean.  Nor is there 
any information about how these statutes could impact a 
person’s adjustment of status application.  As a matter of law, 
Cheruku is, of course, charged with understanding the 
convoluted and hyper technical language on the form she 
received, but Mr. Bumble’s proclamation summarizes the 
reality of the situation. 
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Nevertheless, although I am troubled by our decision 
today, I am cautiously optimistic that our decision may not 
foreclose Cheruku’s ability to remain here nor deprive this 
country of her talents.  On August 18, 2011, the Department 
of Homeland Security issued a letter and accompanying 
guidelines announcing that it plans to better focus its limited 
resources on deporting a more select (and appropriate) group 
of aliens.  See DHS Letter to Senators Regarding Shift In 
Policy on Immigration Enforcement (Aug. 18, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0819-
prosecutorialdiscretion.pdf.   Cheruku is not in the class of 
aliens that the Government's immigration efforts will be 
focused on.  Rather,  DHS will now concentrate its resources 
on “enhancing border security and identifying and removing 
criminal aliens, those who pose a threat to public safety and 
national security, repeat immigration law violators and other 
individuals prioritized for removal.”  Id. at 1.  As part of this 
new strategy, DHS has initiated an interagency working 
group to “execute a case-by-case review of all individuals 
currently in removal proceedings to ensure that they 
constitute our highest priorities.”  Id. at 2.  I can only hope 
that Cheruku will be afforded such review and that the result 
will be favorable to her.   
 
My optimism in that regard is buttressed by a 
memorandum issued by U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement  proving guidance to “ICE” law enforcement 
personnel and attorneys for the exercise of discretion in 
removing aliens.  See Memorandum Regarding Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil 
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency (June 1, 
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.   Some 
of the discretionary factors that ICE will consider include the 
person’s criminal history or lack thereof, whether the person 
is otherwise likely to be granted temporary or permanent 
status or other relief from removal, and the person’s length of 
presence in the United States.  Although it is certainly not our 
place to tell an administrative agency how to apply its 
policies, I do note that it appears that Cheruku would qualify 
for a favorable exercise of discretion under the new policy 
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given her lack of criminal background, her employer’s desire 
that she continue working as a software engineer,  and her 
residence in the United States for the last 16 years.   
 
As early as 1875, the Supreme Court discussed the 
value that immigrants bring to this country’s work force.  The 
Court explained, “[i]n addition to the wealth which some of 
them bring, they bring still more largely the labor which we 
need to till our soil, build our railroads, and develop the latent 
resources of the country in its minerals, its manufactures, and 
its agriculture.”  Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 
U.S. 259, 270 (1875).  Of course, times have changed greatly 
since then.  The time for building railroads has come and 
gone and the need for manual labor is now dwarfed by the 
need for expertise in the scientific and technological 
disciplines. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Court’s original premise is just as 
true today as it was 130 years ago.  Indeed, given the rise of 
the “global village,” the interdependent nature of  “national” 
economies, and the global competition in the marketplace, the 
need for highly specialized expertise is perhaps even greater 
now than the need for manual labor was when the Court made 
its observation in Henderson.  
 
Given the finite resources of law enforcement and 
immigration officials, as well as overburdened immigration 
dockets, it is my hope that the Department of Justice may yet 
decide that Cheruku can remain in the United States and 
continue to function as a contributing member of this society. 
 
 
